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In contrast with prior studies focused on market-wide liquidity co-movements, we study
class-wide liquidity co-movements and condition the analysis on volatility regimes using the
Markov switching methodology. By deﬁning three regimes of volatility (low, normal and
high), we can investigate whether, and to what extent, liquidity co-movements in cap-
based portfolios are aﬀected by volatility ﬂuctuations. As our analysis points out, class-
wide shocks dominate stock-speciﬁc shocks in low volatility regimes for both large and mid
caps. For small caps, cross-sectional statistical evidence of liquidity co-movements is weak
in both high and low volatility regimes. Evidence indicates that failure to recognise the
importance of volatility to determine class-wide variations in liquidity could signiﬁcantly
alter the performance and risk of size-based portfolios.
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and advice.1 Introduction
In asset pricing theory, expected stock returns are sensitive to variations of some key ‘state’ vari-
ables. Market-wide liquidity, which characterizes co-movements between liquidity of diﬀerent
stocks, has been shown to be such a priced state variable in both theoretical and empirical stud-
ies (Amihud and Mendelson 1986, Jacoby, Fowler and Gottesman 2000, Amihud 2002, P´ astor
and Stambaugh 2003, Gibson and Mougeot 2004, Acharya and Pedersen 2005). Evidence on
the existence of such co-movements in spreads or depth is reported by Chordia, Roll and Sub-
rahmanyam (2000) for a sample of 1,169 stocks trading on the New York Stock Exchange in
1992. Concurrent investigations at the daily or intraday frequencies highlight the signiﬁcance
of this systematic liquidity risk on the NYSE (Huberman and Halka 2001, Hasbrouck and
Seppi 2001). In contrast with the ‘market model’ regressions used in Chordia et al. (2000)
where individual liquidity measures are regressed against the liquidity of the market and a set
of control variables, Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) use the principal component and canonical
correlation analyses to examine the existence of common factors in the returns, order ﬂows
and liquidity of the Dow 30 stocks in 1994. The reported evidence points to weaker intraday
co-movements in spreads and depth than in returns and order ﬂows.
Among the potential determinants of such co-movements, the literature has identiﬁed the
speciﬁc design of the market. Specialists appear to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the magnitude of
liquidity co-movements, with stronger correlated changes in the liquidity of stocks managed
by the same specialists (Coughenour and Saad 2004). Weaker co-movements are expected in
quote-driven market structures (Brockman and Chung 2002). Another reason for common
variations in liquidity is index inclusion. For example, Brockman and Chung (2006) show that
1arbitrageurs or fund managers on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange play a signiﬁcant role in
determining the correlated changes in spreads or depth of stocks included in an index.
Brockman, Chung and P´ erignon (2009) provide evidence of a global common component
in the cross-sectional dynamics of liquidity and stress the importance for regulators to mon-
itor the evolution of liquidity. They argue that a spillover of liquidity commonalities beyond
single market structures conveys valuable information regarding the contagion of risk across
instruments or markets. The current ﬁnancial crisis reveals all the signiﬁcant adverse eﬀects
that such a global common component in the cross-sectional dynamics of liquidity can have
on diversiﬁcation. Faced with the current ﬁnancial crisis, all the major regulatory authorities
around the world highlight the urgent need to accurately reﬂect in risk models the adverse
eﬀect of such common liquidity variations.1
With respect to this fast growing body of empirical literature, this paper sheds further
light on liquidity co-movements in several ways. First, commonality in liquidity is studied
within three market capitalisation classes: small, mid, and large caps. More precisely, we
examine whether, and to what extent, liquidity risk due to co-movements is similar within
each class of market capitalisation. For instance, this approach allows us to compare liquidity
co-movements among small caps to liquidity co-movements among large caps. This is an
important and timely topic as style and/or cap-based investment strategies are becoming more
and more popular with active investment managers (e.g. mutual funds focusing on small-cap
stocks, or small-cap value stocks vs. mutual funds investing solely in large-cap stocks, or large-
cap growth stocks). If co-movements in liquidity for small-cap and large-cap stocks feature
1As an illustration, the Financial Times on Thursday, June 19, 2008, ran a story in its column quoting Nout
Wellink, chairman of the Basel committee, as saying: ‘The Basel committees goal is to signiﬁcantly raise the
bar for the management and supervision of liquidity risk at banks’.
2diﬀerent dynamics, this implies that the systematic liquidity risk for both type of stocks should
diverge. Hence, for example, the global cost of rebalancing small-cap or large-cap stocks could
be quite diﬀerent. Moreover, by using a diﬀerent market liquidity index for each class, we avoid
potential measurement biases that are introduced when, for example, a single value-weighted
index is computed for all the stocks.2
Second, our analysis of liquidity co-movements is conditioned on volatility regimes. From
an econometric point of view, the volatility regime states are determined by an endogenous
classiﬁcation rule based on Markov switching models (see Section 3). By deﬁning three regimes
of volatility (low, normal and high), we can investigate to what extent co-movements in liquidity
are aﬀected by volatility ﬂuctuations. This is a key issue for the ﬁnancial community as
liquidity may co-move diﬀerently in volatile and quiet markets. This part of our work provides
market practitioners and stock exchange regulators with a general assessment of the evolution
of liquidity in periods of heightened pressure.
As both market microstructure theories and empirical studies point out, illiquid stocks tend
to be more volatile (Tinic 1972, Benston and Hagerman 1974, Stoll 1978a, Stoll 1978b, Amihud
and Mendelson 1980, Ho and Stoll 1981, Copeland and Galai 1983, Admati and Pﬂeiderer
1988, Foster and Viswanathan 1990, Stoll 2003). Evidence at the aggregate level is however
not conclusive: the positive relation between illiquidity and volatility reported in P´ astor and
Stambaugh (2003) diverges from the ﬁndings of Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001). As
Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (2001) point out, the direct inﬂuence of an increase in volatility
on turnover and its indirect impact on transaction costs makes it extremely diﬃcult to predict
2Large caps automatically display stronger commonalities in liquidity than small caps when a unique value-
weighted index is employed.
3how liquidity will react to an increase in the level of stress in the market. The asymmetric
reaction of liquidity to market stress between order-driven and quote-driven markets reported
in Brockman and Chung (2008) further suggests that this remains an empirical issue. To the
best of our knowledge, these two aspects of our work are new.
Our results can be summarised as follows. First, the magnitude of liquidity co-movements
is on average positively related to the market capitalisation of the portfolio: liquidity co-
movements are least intense among small caps and most intense among large caps. Although
we do not investigate index inclusion in this paper, these results seem to be in agreement
with Brockman and Chung (2006) as large caps belong to many indices routinely traded by
portfolio managers. Compared to market-wide liquidity co-movements (Chordia et al. 2000),
the magnitude of concurrent class-wide liquidity co-movements is smaller, but the proportion of
individual stocks that is positively and signiﬁcantly aﬀected by concurrent class-wide liquidity
shocks is larger. As hinted at above, this has important implications for portfolio managers
implementing style and/or size strategies. Indeed, this seems to indicate that the systematic
cost of rebalancing small-cap stocks funds can be less an issue than when large-cap stocks are
dealt with. Note that this relates to co-movements of small-cap stocks, not the individual
liquidity of small-cap stocks which is of course much poorer than for large-cap stocks. Another
related consequence is that the proportion of individual vs class-wide liquidity risk may be
diﬀerent for small-cap and large-cap stocks, class-wide liquidity risk being more a problem for
large-cap stocks.
Second, the magnitude of class-wide liquidity co-movements are, on a cross-sectional basis,
typically greater in quiet markets for both large and mid caps. In addition, on a stock-by-stock
4basis, around 20% of mid caps (versus 30% of large caps) display signiﬁcantly higher common
liquidity movements in quiet periods than in periods of heightened pressure. Consequently,
class wide price and volatility shocks dominate stock-speciﬁc price and volatility shocks in
low volatility regimes for large and mid caps. When volatility is in the low regime, common
variation in both inventory and adverse selection costs (inducing common liquidity movements)
would dominate stock-speciﬁc variation in both these costs. The opposite is true in stressful
markets: stock-speciﬁc price and volatility shocks dominate class wide price and volatility
shocks. For small caps, cross-sectional statistical evidence of liquidity co-movements is weak
in both high and low volatility regimes. As a consequence, liquidity commonality among small
caps would essentially matter during normal market times.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the data set
and describe the liquidity measures used in this paper. We discuss the empirical results in
Section 3 and conclude in Section 4.
2 Data
In line with the existing literature (Chordia et al. 2000, Chakravarty, Van Ness and Van Ness
2005), we restrict the universe of securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange to class A
shares.3 Following Standard and Poor’s deﬁnition of large, mid and small market capitalisation
classes, we select the ﬁrst hundred stocks in each category at the beginning of each year and
deﬁne three cap-based portfolios accordingly. 4
3Preferred stocks, warrants, rights, derivatives, trusts, closed-end investment companies, ADRs, units, shares
of beneﬁcial interest and realty trusts are thus excluded from our sample.
4Large, mid and small caps respectively represent those companies with a market capitalisation larger than
USD 4 billions, between USD 1 billion and USD 4 billions, and between USD 300 millions and USD 1 billion.
5Tick-by-tick records of transactions and quotations are extracted from the Trades and
Quotes (TAQ) database provided by the NYSE. The sample period covers a ﬁve-year period
starting on January 1, 1995 and ending on September 30, 1999, which represents a total of
1199 trading days. The ﬁltered trades and quotes data sets are matched after correcting for an
average 5-second delay in the time of trades .5 Similar to Chordia et al. (2000), the direction
of each transaction is determined by the Lee and Ready’s (1991) widely-used algorithm6
Our analysis relies on liquidity proxies estimated from the information set available to
market participants before and after executing a transaction. To approximate ex ante liquidity,
we compute for every quotation the proportional quoted spread (PQSt) and the quoted depth
(DEPTHt). The two measures are computed as follows: PQSt = (Ot   Bt)/Mt, where Ot is
the best oﬀer quote available in the market at time t (as displayed in TAQ), Bt is the best
bid quote at time t, and Mt is the mid-quote, that is, the sum of Ot and Bt divided by 2;
DEPTHt = (B Sizet + O Sizet)/2, where B Sizet is the number of shares available at the
best bid quote at time t and O Sizet is the number of shares available at the best oﬀer quote
at time t. To approximate ex post liquidity, we compute for every transaction the proportional
eﬀective spread (PESt) and the proportional traded spread (PTSt). The two measures are
5We discard trades and quotes recorded outside the regular trading hours on the NYSE, that is, before
09:30 or after 16:00 (or 13:00 when the Exchange closed early). Consistent with the ﬁltering applied in Chordia
et al. (2001) or Huang and Stoll (1996), transaction records are further eliminated if (i) the trade price or size
is negative or equal to 0, (ii) the trade price is outside the USD 5 - USD 999 range, or (iii) the trade was
subsequently corrected or canceled. Erroneous recording of quotes is similarly assumed (i) when the (bid or ask)
price or size is negative or equal to 0, (ii) when the quoted spread is negative or wider than USD 4, or (iii) when
the proportional quoted spread is wider than 40%. A proportional eﬀective spread greater than four times the
proportional quoted spread (Chordia et al. 2001) or an absolute change larger than 10% (for the trade price,
bid or ask quote) lead to the deletion of the record. On average, those ﬁlters reject 0.4% of the original trade
records and 0.06% of the quotes.
6As a number of papers in the literature points out, this algorithm is a standard and accurate method for
signing transactions (see, e.g., Easley, O’Hara and Paperman (1998), Madhavan and Soﬁanos (1998), Chordia,
Roll and Subrahmayam (2002) or Hvidkjaer (2006)). This algorithm performs best for NYSE transactions: 93%
of transactions are correctly classiﬁed in the sample examined in Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) while Finucane
(2000) and Odders-White (2000) report 85% of accurate trade directions.
6computed as follows: PESt = [2  Dt  (Pt   Mt 5)]/Mt 5, where Pt denotes the price of a
trade at time t, Dt stands for the direction of the corresponding trade at time t (+1 and -1
for buy and sell orders respectively), and Mt 5 is the mid-quote taking the average 5-second
delay into account; at the transaction level, PTSt = PESt/2.
We then aggregate those tick-by-tick liquidity measures over three intraday intervals: (i)
the morning, from 09:30 to 12:00, (ii) the lunchtime, from 12:00 to 14:00, and (iii) the af-
ternoon intervals, from 14:00 to 16:00. Three aggregation techniques are applied. First, the
equally-weighted average is used to compute the equally-weighted average proportional quoted
spread (EWPQS) and depth (DEPTH). It represents the simplest aggregate measure of ex-
ante liquidity since every observation inside an interval gets the same weight. The second
aggregation technique is the size-weighted average which gives more weight to tick-by-tick
liquidity measures that imply higher depth or higher traded volume. First, we compute the
size-weighted average proportional quoted spread (SWPQS) by weighting each PQSt by the
depth available at time t. Second, we compute the size-weighted average proportional eﬀective
spread (SWPES) by weighting each PESt by the number of shares traded at time t. Third,
we compute the size-weighted average proportional traded spread (SWPTS) by combining the
average eﬀective half-spreads of buy and sell orders, each PTSt being weighted by the number
of shares traded at time t (similar to Stoll, 2003). Finally, the third aggregation technique
is the time-weighted average whereby each tick-by-tick liquidity measure is weighted by its
duration, that is, the number of seconds its corresponding quote remains unchanged in the
market. This technique is used to compute the time-weighted average proportional quoted
spread (TWPQS).
7Table 1 gives some cross-sectional statistics of (time series) means for each of the six
liquidity measures deﬁned above. All measures point to larger liquidity costs for small caps
than for large caps. Consistent with previous studies, there is some positive skewness, that is,
sample means exceeding medians. Positive skewness seems to be more pronounced for small
caps than for large caps. As expected, the proportional eﬀective and traded spreads are smaller
than the proportional quoted spread for all three market cap portfolios. Taking into account
the cross-sectional average of mean price levels, liquidity cost measures are more than three
times higher for small than for large caps.
Size-weighted proportional quoted spreads (SWPQS) are systematically larger than equally-
weighted proportional quoted spreads (EWQS), meaning that larger spreads are posted for
larger quoted sizes. However, proportional quoted spreads are smallest when they are weighted
by the number of seconds they remain unchanged, implying that tighter spreads are posted
on average for longer periods of time. These observations hold for all market cap classes.
All in all, tighter spreads are posted for smaller sizes over a longer time period, and larger
spreads are posted for larger sizes over a shorter time period. Also, size-weighted proportional
traded spreads (SWPTS) are larger than the corresponding eﬀective spreads, in each of the
three market cap categories. Interestingly, depth points to the sharpest diﬀerence in liquidity
between large and small caps since it is more than ten times lower for small caps than for large
caps. Finally, liquidity measures for large caps exhibit stronger ﬁrst-order autocorrelation than
either mid and small caps.
Our liquidity measures are ﬁnally adjusted for the presence of intraday seasonality. The
aggregate data are standardised in a two-step procedure (Hasbrouck and Seppi 2001). First, we
8compute the equally-weighted average and the standard deviation over the sample within each
of the three intraday intervals for each of our proxies. Second, we standardise each liquidity
proxy by subtracting the equally-weighted mean and dividing by the standard deviation. By
construction, each standardised measure has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 over
each intraday interval.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on standardised liquidity measures in both the high
and low volatility regimes.7 Looking at the low volatility regime, all spread-based measures
of liquidity display standard deviations lower than 1, and have negative means and medians,
consistent with the fact that liquidity costs tend to fall in quiet markets. Interestingly, depth
displays positive means for large and mid caps and negative medians for all types of stock.
In quiet markets, displaying higher sizes at the best bid and oﬀer (BBO) does not seem to
be a systematic behaviour of liquidity providers. In the high volatility regime, the means
of all spread-based standardised liquidity measures are above 0, suggesting that illiquidity is
positively correlated to volatility (as found, e.g., in P´ astor and Stambaugh (2003)). In each
market cap class, depth exhibits negative standardised means and medians, with standard
deviations below one. This also points to a positive correlation between illiquidity and volatility
and suggests that spreads and depth depend upon volatility regimes. While the average number
of shares displayed at the BBO shrinks in volatile markets, the standardised average spreads
in the high volatility regime are wider than the unconditional standardised average (equal to
0).8
7The econometric methodology used to deﬁne the three regimes of volatility (low, normal, high) is explained
in Section 3.
8The cross-sectional means of the correlations between the standardised liquidity measures in both high and
low volatility regimes are not reported to save space. All measures of spread are positively correlated to each
other across time and negatively correlated with depth. Although correlations between liquidity measures are
93 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis is carried out in two steps. First, co-movements within each market
capitalisation class are assessed using ‘market model’ time series regressions ` a la Chordia et al.
(2000). Second, the Markov switching methodology is used to deﬁne three regimes of volatility
which the analysis of liquidity co-movements is conditioned upon.
To assess liquidity co-movements within each of the three market capitalisation classes
(small, mid, and large), we ﬁrst follow Chordia et al.’s (2000) methodology. We run ‘market
model’ time series regressions, in which the liquidity proxy of an individual stock is regressed
on the class-wide liquidity proxy.9 The class-wide liquidity proxy is the value-weighted average
of individual liquidity measures of all stocks belonging to the same market capitalisation class
(excluding the dependent-variable stock). We share Hasbrouck and Seppi’s (2001) concern that
diﬀerencing our liquidity measures in the absence of evidence of a unit root may negatively
aﬀect the accuracy of the estimated parameters.10 In addition, although we do not diﬀerentiate
our proxies, we use proportional (and not absolute) measures of liquidity, as described in Section
2. We therefore avoid the potential bias that the tick size reduction (from 1/8th to 1/16th) on
24 June 1997 may introduce when actual values are relied upon.
higher overall in the high volatility regime than in the low one, the diﬀerences are not large. Finally, levels of
correlation are very similar across market capitalisation classes. Tables are available upon request.
9A market-wide liquidity proxy is not appropriate since we study liquidity co-movements within cap-based
portfolios. Large caps automatically display stronger commonalities in liquidity than small caps when a unique
value-weighted index is employed.
10Overdiﬀerenciation may lead to ineﬃcient parameter estimates and spurious correlation in the residuals
(Plosser and Schwert 1977).
10Table 3 reports the cross-sectional averages of estimating the following equation for each
individual stock j included in the large, mid or small market cap portfolio:
Lj;t = αj + β1;jLM;t + β2;jLM;t 1 + β3;jLM;t+1 + γjVj;t +
+1 ∑
i= 1
δi;jRM;t+i + ϵj;t, (1)
where Lj;t is the liquidity proxy in level form for stock j and time interval t, LM;t is the value-
weighted average liquidity in time interval t for all stocks (excluding stock j) that belong to
the same market capitalisation class as stock j,11 LM;t+1 and LM;t 1 are one lead and one lag
of LM;t to account for any non-contemporaneous correlated movement in our liquidity proxy,
Vj;t is the concurrent change in the volatility of stock j, and RM are market returns, of which
the concurrent, lead, and lag values are included.
Table 3 shows evidence of liquidity co-movements within market cap portfolios.12 For
example, the equally-weighted proportional quoted spread (EWPQS) of large caps displays
an average value of 0.25 for β1.13 The highest value for β1 is obtained for the size-weighted
proportional quoted spread (SWPQS). Looking at the values of the diﬀerent β1’s, class-wide
commonalities seem to be lower than market-wide commonalities, as measured by Chordia
et al. (2000) in 1992 (only, but) for 1,169 stocks (mixing large, mid and small caps). However,
the liquidity of a larger proportion of individual stocks are positively and signiﬁcantly aﬀected
by concurrent class-wide liquidity shocks. Indeed, 94.2% of the individual β1;j’s are positive
and statistically greater than 0 at the 5% level in a one-tailed upper t-test (with a critical value
of 1.645).
11This is not a prerequisite in Chordia et al.’s (2000) study.
12Because the tables are already voluminous, we do not report coeﬃcients for the nuisance variables: the
market return and squared stock return.
131 measures the average sensitivity of individual stock liquidity to contemporaneous class-wide liquidity.
11The value and t-statistic of the combined coeﬃcient (labeled ‘Sum’) conﬁrms the ﬁndings
that liquidity co-movements are smaller in magnitude but statistically signiﬁcant. Compared to
previous studies focused on market-wide liquidity, the average R2 that we obtain is much higher,
reaching 0.42 in the EWPQS equation for large caps. On average, we ﬁnd no statistical evidence
of lagged or lead adjustment in liquidity commonality within market cap categories. At the
individual stock level, evidence of non-contemporaneous adjustment in liquidity commonality
is somewhat stronger as the leading and/or lagged terms are positive and signiﬁcant for a larger
proportion of individual stocks than in Chordia et al. (2000). Comparing liquidity measures
among them, the strongest evidence of liquidity co-movements is displayed by spread-based
measures that rely exclusively on quotes (i.e. EWPQS, SWPQS, and TWPQS). Consistent
with Chordia et al. (2000), SWPES, SWPTS, and DEPTH show the weakest sign of liquidity
co-movements.
Comparing market cap classes, liquidity co-movements are most (least) intense among large
(small) caps. Liquidity co-movements among mid caps are in-between, but closer in magnitude
to liquidity co-movements among small caps. Evidence of liquidity co-movements among small
caps is rather mixed. On the one hand, t-statistics for the combined coeﬃcients (‘Sum’) are
higher than the 5% one-tailed critical value in all spread-based liquidity measure equations.
On the other hand, the cross-sectional t-statistic for the average β1 exceeds the 5% one-tailed
critical value in only 3 cases (out of 6), all related to the quoted spread. A recent paper by
Brockman and Chung (2006) links liquidity commonality to index inclusion. While we do
not tackle this issue here, it is well known that large cap stocks are, by deﬁnition, much more
traded by institutional investors and hence are the main constituents of actively traded indices.
12In light of these recent research developments, our results regarding large and small caps are
therefore not surprising.
Table 4 reports the results of three tests. First, we apply a Wald test on a stock-by-
stock basis. The null hypothesis is deﬁned as H0 : β1;j + β2;j + β3;j = 0. We report the
percentage of stocks which signiﬁcantly reject the null at the 5% level. While the magnitude
of class-wide liquidity co-movements is measured by the β and SUM coeﬃcients reported
in Table 3, the Wald test gives information on the pervasiveness of liquidity co-movements
within market cap classes. Looking at proportional measures of liquidity, Table 4 shows that
the null hypothesis is rejected equally often in all three market cap classes. Pervasiveness of
liquidity co-movements is therefore shown to be equivalent in all three categories, although the
cross-sectional β and SUM coeﬃcients in Table 3 point to liquidity co-movements of greater
magnitude among large caps. This observation holds true for proportional quoted-spread
measures of liquidity for which evidence of liquidity co-movements based on cross-sectional
t-statistics was reported to be the strongest. We apply a second Wald test with the null
hypothesis deﬁned as H0 : γj = δ 1;j = δ0;j = δ1;j = 0. We also report the percentage of stocks
which signiﬁcantly reject the null at the 5% level. This test gives stock-by-stock information
on the inﬂuence of variables unrelated to market liquidity. Such inﬂuence is shown to be
equivalent across all three market cap indices and even more pervasive than the inﬂuence of
liquidity co-movements. Finally, we apply a simple F-test and report the percentage of stocks
which signiﬁcantly reject the null at the 1% level. Except for the DEPTH variable, the null is
always rejected by more than 80% of the stocks.
13The second step of our analysis consists in conditioning liquidity co-movements upon volatil-
ity regimes. We ﬁrst measure volatility for each of the three market cap indices. We follow
Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) in deﬁning volatility as the sum of intraday squared returns
over the required intervals. As shown by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), the realised volatility
measure provides a model-free estimation of return volatility over a given time interval. We







i;s+10 + ... + r
2;c
i;S, (2)
where i = s,...,S and rS is the last 5-minute return of interval i, that is, the 5-minute return
corresponding to the [S-5,S] time interval. We standardise the realised volatility measure as
described in Section 2 (as it also exhibits a recurring intraday pattern).
We then split our standardised measures of liquidity into three volatility subsets: low,
neutral and high. To construct these three sub-data sets, we apply a three-state Markov
switching model ` a la Hamilton (1989) to the standardised realised volatility series of each
market cap index. Using the smoothed transition probabilities, we can immediately determine
which volatility observation belongs to which volatility regime. More formally, the standardised
measure of realised volatility is assumed to switch regime according to an unobserved variable
si, where regime 1 is the low-volatility state, regime 2 is the neutral-volatility state, and regime
3 is the high-volatility state. We estimate the parameters of the model using Krolzig’s (1997)
MSVAR package based on the maximum likelihood EM algorithm. The MSIAH speciﬁcation
with regime-dependent intercept and heteroscedasticity is relied upon. In other words, the
standardised realised volatility in state m is equal to µm, with variance σ2
m.
14Table 5 reports the cross-sectional results of estimating the following equation for each




Dk;t(αj;k + βj;kLM;t + γj;kLj;t 1 + ϕj;kVj;t +
+1 ∑
i= 1
δi;j;kRM;t+i) + ϵj;t, (3)
where D1;t (D2;t, D3;t) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 in quiet (normal, volatile)
markets and 0 otherwise.
In the large cap portfolio, all our liquidity proxies exhibit positive and signiﬁcant cross-
sectional average values for the βj;1 coeﬃcient. Correlated movements of liquidity in the quiet
regime of volatility are accordingly strongest for SWPQS (0.233) and weakest for SWPTS
(0.159). In this regime, at least 79% (53%) of large caps have a positive (and signiﬁcant)
βj;1. Liquidity commonalities in quiet markets for large caps are indisputable. A comparison
between liquidity co-movements in the low and high regimes of volatility points to several
diﬀerences. First, the magnitude of spread-based liquidity co-movements for large caps is
greater in quiet markets than in volatile markets: β1 is greater than β3 for all spread-based
liquidity measures. The opposite is true for the DEPTH variable. Second, β3 is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 0 in fewer cases than β1. For example, β3 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
0 for proportional spread-based measures that rely on transaction prices (i.e. SWPES and
SWPTS). For the three proportional quoted spread measures of liquidity, β3 is only marginally
signiﬁcant.
Further evidence of the importance of volatility regimes for assessing liquidity commonali-
ties among large caps is given by the Wald test. The null hypothesis of the Wald test states that
15the magnitude of liquidity co-movements is statistically equivalent in quiet and stressful mar-
kets. In other words, the null states that liquidity co-movements for large caps do not depend
upon the volatility regime of the portfolio to which they belong. When we look at spread-
based liquidity co-movements, the null is not rejected for around 65% of large caps. However,
around 30% of large caps reject the null against the alternative that liquidity co-movements are
greater in quiet markets. Interestingly, such an eﬀect is also true, albeit less obvious, regarding
depth-based liquidity co-movements: less than 20% of stocks reject the null of the Wald test
against the upper one-tailed test. So, quote-based and spread-based liquidity co-movements
among large caps react to volatility in a similar way. All in all, large caps exhibit signiﬁcantly
greater liquidity co-movements in quiet markets than in stressful markets. Therefore, spread
and quote adjustments may be more stock-speciﬁc in stressful than in quiet markets. The
logical implication is that class wide price and volatility shocks dominate stock-speciﬁc price
and volatility shocks in low volatility regimes, i.e. quiet markets. When volatility is in the
low regime, common variation in both inventory and adverse selection costs (inducing common
liquidity movements) would dominate stock-speciﬁc variation in both these costs. The opposite
is true in stressful markets: stock-speciﬁc price and volatility shocks dominate class wide price
and volatility shocks. At ﬁrst sight, such evidence goes against Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) who relate market liquidity to funding liquidity. They show that commonalities in liq-
uidity are related to the ﬁnancing constraints that liquidity providers (e.g. market-makers and
arbitrageurs) face following a negative shock on market prices. These constraints amplify the
eﬀect of the initial shock on prices and therefore lead simultaneously to an increase in both
liquidity co-movement and volatility. One would therefore expect co-movements in liquidity to
be higher when volatility is high. However, the three volatility regimes used in our study are
16endogenously determined and are not conditioned upon funding liquidity constraints. In other
words, volatility can be high even if liquidity providers do not face any ﬁnancing constraint,
which prevents us from testing the Brunnermeier and Pedersen theoretical model.
Consistent with the preceding unconditional analysis of liquidity co-movements, mid caps
exhibit smaller β coeﬃcients than large caps. Again, the magnitude of liquidity co-movements
is greater in quiet markets. Cross-sectional statistical evidence points to sharp diﬀerences in
liquidity co-movements between the high and low volatility regimes: while β1 is always positive
and signiﬁcant, β3 is positive but insigniﬁcant in all cases but one. The Wald test indicates
that around 25% of mid-caps reject the null of no diﬀerence in liquidity co-movements between
the high and low volatility regimes. Around 20% of mid caps (versus 30% of large caps) display
signiﬁcantly higher common liquidity movements in quiet periods than in periods of heightened
pressure.
Interestingly, the cross-sectional average of βj;1 for small caps is smaller than the cross-
sectional average of βj;3. However, β3 is never statistically diﬀerent from zero on a cross-
sectional basis. So, statistical evidence of liquidity co-movements among small caps is weak
in the high volatility regime. The only relevant evidence of diﬀerent liquidity co-movements
between the high and low volatility regimes is reported by the proportional quoted-spread
measures of liquidity, as β1 is signiﬁcant while β3 is not. Although there is rather weak cross-
sectional evidence of diﬀerent liquidity co-movements among small caps between the high and
low volatility regimes, the Wald test still reveals that around 15% of small caps reject the
null of no diﬀerence in liquidity co-movements between the two volatility regimes, in favor of
greater liquidity co-movements in quiet markets.
174 Conclusion
Liquidity co-movements are studied within three diﬀerent market capitalisation portfolios:
small, mid and large. The magnitude of liquidity co-movements is on average positively related
to the market capitalisation of the index: liquidity co-movements are least intense among small
caps and most intense among large caps. The magnitude of concurrent class-wide liquidity co-
movements is smaller than market-wide liquidity movements as measured by Chordia et al.
(2000). However, the proportion of individual stocks that is positively and signiﬁcantly aﬀected
by concurrent class-wide liquidity shocks is larger. Interestingly, all three market cap portfolios
exhibit the same degree of pervasiveness in class-wide liquidity co-movements, as measured by
the percentage of stocks with statistically positive beta coeﬃcients.
In the last stage of the study, we condition our analysis of class-wide liquidity co-movements
upon volatility regimes. By deﬁning three regimes of volatility (low, neutral and high), we
analyse how liquidity co-movements among large, mid and small caps are aﬀected by volatility
ﬂuctuations. In all market cap indices, a comparison between liquidity co-movements in the
low and high regimes of volatility reveals interesting diﬀerences.
The magnitude of liquidity co-movements among large caps is, on a cross-sectional basis,
typically greater in quiet markets. In addition, on a stock-by-stock basis, around 30% of large
caps exhibit signiﬁcantly greater liquidity co-movements in quiet markets than in stressful
markets. Consequently, class wide price and volatility shocks dominate stock-speciﬁc price and
volatility shocks in low volatility regimes for large caps. When volatility is in the low regime,
common variation in both inventory and adverse selection costs (inducing common liquidity
18movements) would dominate stock-speciﬁc variation in both these costs. The opposite is true
in stressful markets: stock-speciﬁc price and volatility shocks dominate class wide price and
volatility shocks.
In the mid cap portfolio, cross-sectional statistical evidence points to sharp diﬀerences in
class-wide liquidity co-movements between the high and low volatility regimes. While the
magnitude of liquidity co-movements among mid caps is also greater in quiet markets, it
remains below the sensitivity of large caps to class wide liquidity variations. In addition,
around 20% of mid caps (versus 30% of large caps) display signiﬁcantly greater class wide
liquidity movements in quiet periods than in periods of heightened pressure.
For small caps, cross-sectional statistical evidence of liquidity co-movements is weak in
both high and low volatility regimes. As a consequence, liquidity commonality among small
caps would essentially matter during normal market times, that is, when the index volatility
is neither in the high nor in the low regime.
This general assessment of the provision of liquidity on the NYSE arguably conveys valu-
able information for stock exchange regulators monitoring the operation of the market and
the behaviour of specialists. Our results additionally suggest that ﬁnancial managers should
update their models to account for the risk of systematic changes in liquidity across stocks.
The implementation of portfolio decisions and the management of market risks are indeed
critically inﬂuenced by the liquidity of the underlying instruments. As our analysis points out,
failure to recognise the importance of this systematic liquidity risk could signiﬁcantly alter the
performance and risk of portfolios.
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25Table 3: Liquidity co-movements in market capitalisation portfolios
Symbol EWPQS SWPQS TWPQS
L M S L M S L M S
Concurrent 0.250 0.178 0.208 0.254 0.163 0.187 0.229 0.172 0.210
t-statistic 3.255 1.997 2.267 3.263 1.863 2.014 2.957 1.910 2.290
% + 94.20 92.80 91.40 94.60 92.80 90.80 94.60 90.20 91.80
% + signiﬁcant 79.20 62.80 68.00 81.60 58.40 60.60 77.60 61.60 65.60
Lag 0.062 0.075 0.039 0.052 0.074 0.043 0.064 0.074 0.041
t-statistic 0.950 0.977 0.717 0.811 0.941 0.734 0.961 0.988 0.732
% + 76.00 74.60 66.60 70.40 74.80 66.00 76.40 75.20 65.20
% + signiﬁcant 30.80 31.40 27.40 27.00 31.40 28.00 32.00 29.80 29.80
Lead 0.031 0.060 0.035 0.026 0.062 0.040 0.038 0.063 0.034
t-statistic 0.454 0.781 0.688 0.391 0.782 0.717 0.483 0.827 0.683
% + 59.40 70.20 63.40 61.60 67.80 62.80 60.00 68.00 64.20
% + signiﬁcant 23.20 28.20 27.60 22.00 28.40 27.20 24.60 32.20 28.20
Sum Mean 0.342 0.313 0.282 0.331 0.299 0.270 0.330 0.310 0.284
t-statistic 5.950 6.016 5.130 5.754 5.732 4.957 5.633 5.932 5.063
Sum Median 0.328 0.293 0.251 0.316 0.268 0.243 0.302 0.294 0.260
t-statistic 5.694 5.635 4.555 5.492 5.148 4.465 5.158 5.636 4.623
Adj. R
2 Mean 0.420 0.341 0.286 0.362 0.295 0.251 0.404 0.307 0.249
Adj. R
2 Median 0.373 0.304 0.245 0.303 0.245 0.209 0.365 0.266 0.201
Symbol SWPES SWPTS DEPTH
L M S L M S L M S
Concurrent 0.176 0.095 0.094 0.118 0.073 0.090 0.195 0.073 0.039
t-statistic 2.806 1.541 1.546 1.631 0.993 1.331 3.285 1.190 0.639
% + 95.80 86.00 86.60 78.60 78.00 83.00 97.20 83.40 72.20
% + signiﬁcant 65.60 49.00 46.60 45.40 32.00 42.60 79.80 35.80 19.40
Lag 0.001 0.029 0.029 0.032 0.056 0.046 0.021 0.024 0.022
t-statistic -0.025 0.463 0.500 0.500 0.808 0.709 0.404 0.309 0.302
% + 48.00 62.60 64.80 61.80 72.60 70.20 57.80 58.40 57.40
% + signiﬁcant 14.20 19.00 20.00 21.00 27.80 26.60 24.40 16.60 18.20
Lead 0.009 0.031 0.025 0.034 0.052 0.044 0.013 0.021 0.019
t-statistic 0.120 0.472 0.443 0.438 0.714 0.717 0.252 0.301 0.255
% + 52.00 59.80 61.00 60.00 68.80 67.00 56.80 56.00 55.80
% + signiﬁcant 17.60 17.00 20.00 21.00 24.60 27.40 23.20 16.60 16.20
Sum Mean 0.186 0.155 0.147 0.184 0.182 0.180 0.229 0.119 0.080
t-statistic 3.323 3.273 2.898 3.367 3.870 3.503 3.924 1.895 1.179
Sum Median 0.145 0.118 0.119 0.145 0.132 0.156 0.212 0.091 0.062
t-statistic 2.595 2.494 2.352 2.656 2.815 3.034 3.632 1.453 0.913
Adj. R
2 Mean 0.269 0.215 0.222 0.299 0.258 0.257 0.137 0.067 0.045
Adj. R
2 Median 0.246 0.191 0.200 0.275 0.233 0.231 0.088 0.035 0.021
Equally-weighted cross-sectional means of time series slope coeﬃcients are reported, with their cor-
responding t-statistics. Newey and West’s (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
standard errors are computed, using Newey and West’s (1994) automatic truncation lag procedure.
SUM = concurrent + lag + lead coeﬃcients. ‘%+’ reports the percentage of positive slope coeﬃ-
cients while ‘%+ signiﬁcant’ gives the percentage of positive slope coeﬃcients which are statistically
diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level in a one-tailed upper t-test.
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